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8 May 1961

TO: CHIEF, PO

SUBJ: National Strategy for the "Cold War" of the United States

This paper offers a very provocative and stimulating approach to our major strategy problem; namely, how to terminate the present "cold war" without either provoking a general war or without suffering defeat in the "cold war" itself.

A nation's strategy must bear some relation to a nation's fundamental policy. Although US policy, if it is anything, is to maintain the "peace," it has progressed to the point that it now recognizes that it is wiser to run the risk of war than to seek peace by avoiding all risks. The US has recognized that the Soviet leaders cannot be deterred from their path of action by any concessions we may make. At the same time, there is no way of knowing whether or not the Soviets will initiate a "hot war" or prefer to continue with the "cold war."

Notwithstanding, U.S. National Strategy appears to be based on the assumption that a general war is almost inevitable. The unprecedented \$60,000,000,000.00 FY 1962 Defense budget is a straw in the wind. History records few instances when a progressive mobilization of the relative magnitude of the current U.S. effort has not been terminated in war. Although the inevitability of war may be argued, there is universal agreement that U.S. mobilization is the prerequisite to the continued maintenance of the present "peace."

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The subject paper states that, "We are very apt to be confronted for many, many years with the same sort of dangerous uneasy world in which we now live." Once our mobilization is achieved, the prospect of maintaining a constant war economy will not be very inviting to the American people. The cost of our maintaining the military build-up of the Western world is likely to be prohibitive after a certain point in time. They may press for action to settle the stale-mate and bring about the very war which our mobilization is designed to prevent. The paper postulates that war may be the only genuine way of putting an end to the "cold war" within any considerable period of time. Although the proponents of preventive war will always be vocal, it will be impossible for any administration to start one.

There is another factor, however, which the paper neglects to discuss, and that is the possibility that the Soviet Union may achieve some sort of atomic equality prior to the time that the US and its allies achieve an adequate military posture in land and tactical air forces. Because this possibility exists, the deterrent value of the A-Bomb may be lost before the conventional rearmament becomes adequate, the "cold war" may come to an unfortunate end for us, rather than dragging on indefinitely.

To surmise these preceeding points, (1) a "cold war" may be ended by the US initiating a "hot war" during the period of its atomic ascendancy, or (2) the Soviet Union may end the "cold war" by initiating a "hot war" after it attains atomic equality and before the US achieves adequate strength and conventional forces.

As it is unlikely that the US will take the first course of action, it faces a catastrophic showdown unless it can prevent the Soviets' taking

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the second course of action.

This analysis adds all the more significance to the conclusion reached in the paper that, "the only weapon short of war or the genuine threat of war which has any real chance of being decisive in the "cold" war within a reasonable length of time is that of the underground and resistance movements in Communist countries."

The existence of large numbers of discontented people and, therefore, of potential resistance is certainly fundamental to the success of any efforts to overthrow the present Soviet regime. Passive resistance, even on an unorganized basis, coupled with, for example, a split of the Army from the Party, or a split in the elite - whether geared to Stalin's death or not - might bring about the result we want. The difficulties that lie in the path of activating "active" resistance on a particular D-Day are pointed out in the paper and they are of such a magnitude that alternatives of the sort suggested should be fully explored and tried before widespread resistance per se is wholly relied upon.

The paper emphasizes the fact that almost no coordinated planning has been accomplished in the US government to terminate the "cold" war by upsetting the Soviet regime. It expresses in different words the analysis made in conjunction with the "Scope and Magnitude" papers that almost all of our conventional governmental departments and agencies (primarily the State Department and ECA) are either (1) combatting continuing emergencies or else (2) making preparations on the assumption that there will be a general war (Defense Department).

After explaining some of the reasons why there has been a failure to plan for "cold" war and a "cold" war victory at the government level, the paper implies that OPC is a suitable existing vehicle for doing the planning required for an integrated major "cold" war effort.

The central thought developed in the paper is the idea that our planning for a major "cold" war effort must be related to some single D-Day on which an integrated "cold" war offensive would take place. It is the paper's position that a fixed point of departure in time would permit those charged with any "cold" war activities to separate operations from plans and preparations; and to permit coordinated "cold" war operations to unfold according to plan. The acceptance of a D-Day for major coordinated actions in the "cold" war would give coherence and simplification of concept to our planning.

The proffered ^{concept} of a "cold" war D-Day is an extremely useful one. The Plans Division has already marked out for itself the task of generating three general types of plans: (1) The emergency plan - covering the period required for OPC to reach its mobilization platform (approximately December 31, 1952), (2) The mid-range plan - the period from December 31, 1952 until the US and its allies reach an adequate military posture (perhaps sometime in 1953-54), (3) The long-range plan - after the US has achieved adequate military posture and before the Soviets had neutralized our atomic superiority.

Our long-range plan should be developed in accordance with the D-Day concept established in the subject paper. D-Day in this connection

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Should be considered as the date after which a general uprising could profitably be undertaken. The exact date is one that can not be set in advance. The time of launching must depend, to a large extent, on events outside the control of the U.S. The selection of the right moment is the most difficult task of all. No one can foresee what might be the consequences of a full-scale "cold" war offensive against the Soviet system. The impact of such an offensive upon the Soviet leaders would be primarily psychological and, consequently, to a degree unpredictable. The maximum benefit might be to create such a serious dislocation in the Soviet mechanism of control as to bring about a collapse from within. An inferior but desirable result might be to produce such a general deterioration in the Soviet situation as to render impotent for a long time to come the Soviet military threat to the free world.

A risk inherent in an all-out "cold" war offensive is the possibility that the Soviet regime, fighting for its life, might consider war as the only possible means of assuring its survival. Therefore, the "cold" war offensive must be very carefully coordinated with military plans to counter any Soviet military action thus induced. Consequently, the plan must comprise two major parts:

- (1) The initial "cold" war uprising aimed at dislocating the Soviet power, and
- (2) The immediate exploitation of this dislocation, whether it be by direct assistance to forces aroused by the uprising or by direct action against the Soviet military forces.

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Psychological dislocation could spring from placing the Soviet leaders in an inescapable trap comprised, on the one hand, of their revolting subjects; and, on the other, by a containing wall of Allied military force.

Because of the great potential value of this approach, I recommend that the idea itself and the subject paper be very closely held, and that the Plans Division develop, at the earliest possible date, a plan for the orderly development of the type plan required to implement the concept established in this paper.

If this task is given to the Plans Division the necessity of obtaining some top-flight planners becomes all the more imperative.

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Plans Division

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